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This article focuses on the presence of non-political power in societal
constitutions and their imaginaries. The theory of societal constitutions
recontextualizes constitutionalism beyond public law, statehood, and
polity. However, it also raises the question of legitimation and the
authority of these non-polity-based constitutional regimes operating
independently of public reasoning. Societal constitutions enhance
power through specific knowledge regimes and imaginaries transform
them into generally shared systems of rules and norms. This constitu-
tionalization of the systemic facts of power as legitimizing values of the
system can be identified in political as much as societal constitutions.
The theory of societal constitutions, therefore, needs to use Foucault's
analytics of power and Teubner's democratic proceduralization of
dissent as well as Luhmann's ironies of autopoietic social systems to
formulate a genealogy of legal normativity and its societal
legitimation.
The concept of constitutionalism is another name for the transformation of
power into authority. It includes the constitution as a formal document
establishing institutions of power and specifying their operations. It also
defines both internal legal and external societal limitations of such
constituted power. Finally, it specifies a set of values, principles and ideals
which inform the meaning of constituted power. Constitutionalism thus
connects the internal aspect of the constitution as a normative instrument of
political power and its external aspect as both limitation and legitimation of
the same power by social environment.
In ancient Rome, the concept of potestas referred to the power as
enforcement and coercion. It was exercised by magistrates and directly
linked to the imperium as the ultimate form of power in hands of the highest
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magistrates, such as consuls and praetors. On the other hand, the Roman
Senate and jurists or prudentes exercised auctoritas based on legal
knowledge. This authority of law makers, experts, and agents was as
important for the Roman polity as its imperial power.
The potestas/auctoritas distinction subsequently informed the investiture
controversy between secular and religious powers in medieval Europe and
the historical emergence of modern constitutional politics.1 Tensions
between general governing skills and specific entitlements to government
were formulated in medieval jurisprudence as the distinction between
gubernaculum and iurisdictio (government and jurisdiction).2 The trans-
formation of political power into constitutional authority became a familiar
story of the rise of modern democratic constitutionalism which further
nurtured the constitutional imaginary of the self-ruled and self-governing
polity constituted by a legal document incorporating its common political
values, principles and ideals.
However, the sociological approach to constitutionalism must adopt
another distinction, namely, the potentia/potestas which which was philo-
sophically elaborated by Baruch Spinoza3 and can be sociologically refor-
mulated as the difference between the multiplicity of societal power
(potentia) and the unity of institutionalized political power (potestas).4
Potentia signifies a capacity in the most general sense and constitutes a
relationship to the whole society. It is a societal force or might. On the other
hand, potestas is already defined by specific institutions and constitutes a
relationship of political domination. It is identified with the political right to
legitimate rule and represents one of many societal manifestations and
realizations of potentia. Potentia is constituted by society while potestas is
already determined by the specific coupling between political enforcement
and legal authorization. If potentia is a general capacity for execution or the
execution itself, potestas can be defined as a potentia validated by politically
recognized criteria of legitimacy.
Sociological perspectives of power, political domination, its organization
and legitimation can be perceived as a modern reformulation of classical
political and legal concepts which draw on the general distinction between
societal power operating in different systems, sectors, and regimes of
modern society and political power as the specific medium of the political
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system. The first paradox of societal constitutionalism thus consists of the
infinite potential of society to transform itself into an organizing principle of
political unity. Through this paradox, the potentia/potestas distinction also
reveals the general distinction between the concepts of society and polity
because the latter is inseparable from structures and symbols of authority
while the former refers to the plurality of non-political power structures in
the polity's social environment.5 It is subsequently possible to rethink the
constitution as a system organizing the most general distinctions between
societal and political power and legal authority ± potentia, potestas, and
auctoritas both within and beyond national and international polities and the
constitutional state as the typical organization of politics in modern society
and its legitimacy holder.
In this article, I revisit the sociological concept of power and its limitation
by the political system and further coding by legality. The innovative
approaches of the theory of societal constitutions recontextualize constitu-
tionalism beyond public law, statehood, and polity. However, they also raise
the question of legitimation and the authority of these non-polity-based
constitutional regimes operating independently of public reasoning. As
Gunther Teubner's contribution to this volume shows, the theory of societal
constitutions must respond to the question of democratic legitimation and its
potential to accommodate both consensus and dissenting strategies at trans-
national level. I, therefore, argue that the theory of societal constitutionalism
has to focus on the presence of non-political power in societal constitutions
and its various forms of politicization and authorization. Global society is
typical of the surplus of power and the shortage of authority, and its societal
constitutions are the holders of power beyond politics constituted by
different knowledge regimes and their legitimizing imaginaries. The societal
power of systemic governmentality cannot be contained by political power in
the form of either representative government, or administrative governance.
Because societal constitutions enhance power through specific knowledge
regimes, it is important to analyse how different imaginaries are used to
transform these specific expert regimes into generally shared systems of
rules and norms. This constitutionalization of systemic facts of power as
legitimizing values of the system, which operates as the transformation of
societal immanence into transcendental values, principles, and ideals can be
identified in political as much as societal constitutions. The theory of societal
constitutions, therefore, needs to use Foucault's analytics of power and
Teubner's democratic proceduralization of dissent as well as Luhmann's
ironies of autopoietic social systems to reformulate legal and moral philo-
sophical distinctions between facts and norms as a genealogy of legal
normativity and its societal legitimation.
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FROM LEGAL CONSTITUTIONS AND SUBJECTS OF POWER TO THE
POWER OF NORMALIZATION SYSTEMS: ON POTENTIA
Sociological inquiries often draw on the image of society as a network of
power relations or institutionalized domination in which its members can
enforce their will and realize their interests. This classic image informs
Weber's ideal types of legitimacy6 as much as Durkheim's concepts of social
solidarity and collective consciousness.7 The idea that power is both a
limiting structure and a productive societal force belongs to the sociological
tradition as much as different critical theories and normative philosophies of
politics and law.
This modern perspective is often inspired by Spinoza's original distinc-
tion between potentia and potestas which was recently adopted by critical
philosophy, especially by Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri8 and their
followers within critical political and legal theory.9 In this context, the
politics of privileging the state potestas is commonly contrasted to the
progressive activism of potentia opening up new political possibilities and
imaginaries of self-affirmation and self-determination.10 The people and its
community are heroically and tragically described as potentia trampled upon
by the potestas of state repression.11 Political philosophies and traditions
from Hobbes to Schmitt are explored in order to address possible asym-
metries, priorities, privileged positions, normative possibilities, and even
complex political and ideological visions associated with this distinction
which is expected to both alert the reader to existing social injustices and
provide for healing solutions to the ills of global society.12
However, Spinoza's distinction between potentia and potestas also invites
less morally apocalyptic13 and more sociologically enlightening interpreta-
S33
6 M. Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 1 (1968) 212±99.
7 E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (1933).
8 See, especially, G. Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1988); A. Negri, The
Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics (1991); A. Negri,
Subversive Spinoza: (Un)contemporary variations (2004); A. Negri, Spinoza for Our
Time: Politics and Postmodernity (2013); see, also, E. Balibar, Spinoza and Politics
(1998).
9 S. Ruddick, `The Politics of Affect. Spinoza in the Work of Negri and Deleuze'
(2010) 27(4) Theory, Culture & Society 21±45.
10 M. Gatens (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza (2009); W. Montag,
Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and His Contemporaries (1999); H. Sharp, `Why
Spinoza Today? Or, `` A Strategy of Anti-Fear''' (2005) 17 Rethinking Marxism 591.
11 E. Dussel, Twenty Theses on Politics (2018) 13±35.
12 C. Altini, ` `` Potentia''as `` potestas'': An interpretation of modern politics between
Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt' (2010) 36 Philosophy & Social Inquiry 231.
13 This philosophy of human apocalypse is particularly strong in the popular writings of
Giorgio Agamben; see G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life
(1998) 44; see, also, D. Vardoulakis, `The End of Stasis: Spinoza as a reader of
Agamben' (2010) 51 Culture, Theory and Critique 145.
ß 2018 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2018 Cardiff University Law School
tions even in the realm of critical philosophy. Spinoza's philosophy of
immanence is surprisingly close to Michel Foucault's critique of sovereignty
and the genealogy of power of the social norm and biopolitics.14 Further-
more, Foucault's notion of power as normalization and governmentality15 of
subjects in society defined by specific styles of reasoning, collective pat-
terns, practices, strategies, and technologies constituting the self include
thoughts similar to Durkheim's idea of the commonplaces of rule and social
discipline outside the state government16 and the Weberian sociological
reading of Nietzsche's philosophy of the will to power.17 Foucault's
analytics of power as normalization and governmentality, therefore, offers
new possibilities as to how to formulate the distinction between power as a
productive force and restrictive domination even within the theory of societal
constitutionalism and social welfare.18
Foucault famously argued that modernity means the decline of the
juridical notion of sovereignty and the political centrality of the state.
According to him, power has to be analysed in terms of force and not as
relations and institutions privileging law as manifestations of power.19
Neither can power be comprehended in the Marxist sense of repression and
alienation or the liberal sense of consensus and participation. As Foucault
noted in his lecture on the theory of sovereignty and disciplinary power:
Power must, I think, be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as
something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized
here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is never appropriated in
the way that wealth or a commodity can be appropriated. Power functions.
Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate
in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this
power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always
its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to
them.20
Formulating the two limits of modern power which are irreconcilable and in
permanent conflict, namely, a right of sovereignty dispersed in the social
body and a mechanics of coercive disciplines guaranteeing the cohesion of
this body, Foucault added:
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The discourse of discipline is alien to that of the law; it is alien to the discourse
that makes rules a product of the will of the sovereign. The discourse of
disciplines is about a rule: not a juridical rule derived from sovereignty, but a
discourse about a natural rule, or in other words a norm. Disciplines will
define not a code of law, but a code of normalization, and they will necessarily
refer to a theoretical horizon that is not the edifice of law, but the field of the
human sciences. And the jurisprudence of these disciplines will be that of a
clinical knowledge.21
Foucault's approach gets criticized for dissolving power by reformulating
the modern philosophical problem of the constitution of the subject through
subjection to power, and making resistance to power part of its expansive
strategies and technologies.22 Nevertheless, Foucault's placement of tech-
nologies of governing our physical and social relationships and selves
outside the strategic power games of individuals seeking liberties and
influence over others, and the institutional power of political domination,
points to the important societal and knowledge dimension of power which is
neither codified by legality and enforced by politics, nor reducible to the
social relationships and interplay of individual and collective will and
intention.23
Foucault's concept of governmentality includes the problem of normaliza-
tion and the normalizing practices of society through its systems of scientific
knowledge, education, criminal justice, health care, psychiatry, welfare
policies, and so on.24 His discussion of the productive and normalizing
operations of power effectively dismantles the normative political and
juridical notion of power as liberation from different kinds of political and
societal oppression.25 The power of the social norm is expansive and driven
by activity and stimulation rather than acceptance and repression. It is not a
power of the self-governing people but a societal power administering,
organizing, multiplying, regulating, and optimizing the lives of the popula-
tion. It is a power of generating forces in the population's life, not a power of
the self-constituent political subject of the people.26
Unlike the normatively formulated potestas of obligations and authoriza-
tions, this potentia of normalization consists of societal capacities, technolo-
gies, strategies, and knowledge. As Foucault put it in his study of the forms
of power and knowledge, no knowledge is formed without a system of power
communication and no power is exercised without the appropriation,
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distribution, and restraint of a knowledge.27 Criticizing the philosophy of
existentialism and its vitalism and calls for authenticity, he even stated:
Behind the completed system, what is discovered by the analysis of formations
is not the bubbling source of life itself, life in an as yet uncaptured state; it is
an immense density of systematicities, a tight group of multiple relations . . .
One is not seeking, therefore, to pass from the text to thought, from talk to
silence, from the exterior to the interior, from spatial dispersion to the pure
recollection of the moment, from superficial multiplicity to profound unity.28
The societal power of systemic governmentality is impossible to contain by
political power in the form of either representative government or admini-
strative governance. It does not recognize political borders and institutional
limitations of the modern nation state and informs power techniques and
strategies evolving at supranational and transnational global levels.29
THE CONSTITUENT POWER OF SOCIAL IMAGINARIES:
THE FIRST COMMENT ON LEGITIMATION
Societal power, potentia, is a generic condition of the constitution of
political power, potestas, and its exercise as auctoritas is the legitimate rule
of law. In a completely different philosophical context, John Searle refers to
this active force and potentiality as `background/network power'30 and
defines it as a set of normative limitations on all members of a polity which
externally legitimizes the government as `the ultimate institutional struc-
ture'31 of politically organized societies. In other words, while political
power requires a functioning government for its legitimation, this func-
tioning is not enough for legitimation. The self-legitimation of government
by the efficiency of its power always remains deficient. It is not just a matter
of institutions and individual or collective interests and, as such, cannot be
fully captured by the medium of money, legality or scientific truth. The
steering capacity of gubernaculum32 always calls for some kind of iurisdictio
in the juridical or alternative societal forms.
Using the concept of background power, Searle actually revisits the idea
that political power must be constituted, limited, and legitimized by its social
environment. Instead of divine or natural laws, this societal legitimation of
positive law and power constructs a very special notion of the public sphere
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which functions as an external normative reservoir of political legitimacy. In
this rich tradition of moral philosophy and normative social theory, societal
power is defined as the power of the common space, mind and will turning
society into the imagined community of a self-governing people and one
political nation.
The modern social imaginary of the public sphere, reason, and formation
of the collective political will draws on the difference between the social and
political order and considers non-political norms and structures conditions
and criteria of political legitimacy. According to this view, the modern polity
can be observed and judged from outside. As Charles Taylor noted, this
social imaginary, apart from the public sphere, draws on the social autonomy
of the economy and the defence of individual rights which further requires
that political society operates on the basis of the consent of those living in it.
Modern polities is thus socially differentiated, morally individualized,
politically legitimized by consensus, and its symbolic rationality is driven by
the image of the social contract guaranteeing equal and direct access by all
members of society to its political order.33 According to Taylor, this image
of polity is part of a new concept of the order of modern society which is
determined by societal practices and their meaning and `the ways people
imagine their social existence' rather than by a set of fixed ideas.34 In short,
the social imaginary operates as a reservoir of a common understanding and
`a shared sense of legitimacy.'35
Taylor's concept of social imaginaries is important because it shifts the
emphasis from the performance of social and political institutions and prac-
tices to the symbolic system of images and normative self-descriptions of
society as the moral and meaningful unit. The concept of social imaginaries,
therefore, also critically reflects on the specific role of political and legal
philosophies which often look for normative conditions and reasons for unity
and certainty in an otherwise morally pluralistic and contingently evolving
modern society. For instance, JuÈrgen Habermas depicts the public sphere as
the basic structure of civil society connecting the authentic experiences of
life-world and the rationality of functionally differentiated systems of law
and politics.36 In the more specific context of legal philosophy, yet the same
spirit of Enlightenment, Ronald Dworkin similarly claimed that there was
one right solution even to hard cases if judges apply the right principles; that
is Dworkin's legal theory. According to its author, this theory offers recourse
to a morally, legally, and politically unified society guided by common and
`objectively valid' principles.37 The holistic perspective of political com-
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munities under such a rule of principled law does not allow for alternative
legal theoretical views. They have to be eliminated as incorrect and false if
Dworkin's theory of true legal principles is to guide the polity without
academic, political, and juristic doubts.
Against these normative political and legal philosophical claims, Taylor,
despite his sympathies for Habermas, Locke, Grotius, and many other of the
finest philosophers, offers a second-order observer's view of this process of
legitimation by theoretical knowledge and shows that such attempts at
reconciling the meaningful existence and functional differentiation of
modern society are already part of the specifically modern social imaginary.
Images of the public sphere facilitating a rational discourse and political
consensus outside the constraints of power constitute the normative and
legitimizing condition of power in the Enlightenment spirit of veritas, non
auctoritas facit legem (truth, not authority, makes law).38
Expanding Taylor's argument, it is possible to state that modern society
observes itself and constructs its `true' self-images and normative imaginaries
with or without philosophers, moralists, and social reformers searching for
political principles, moral ideals, values, and deontic foundations of
legitimate power. This fact itself should lead to further investigations of
specific societal constitutions of power and its legitimizing imaginaries and
procedures within and beyond the systems of positive law and politics.
Sociology is not an exclusive science of power structures, yet neither can
it ignore societal processes of power formations, operations, and
legitimations. It needs to avoid both the reductionist approaches of political
sciences and the inflationary uses of the concept of power typical of critical
theory and philosophy. Its job is to find a measured conceptualization of
societal power and its constitutionalization both within and beyond politics
and law which would neither overburden the concept of power, nor make it
redundant. It needs to avoid the pitfalls of both psychological reductions of
power as merely an influence on the individual's behaviour and critical
humanist perspectives of power as cultural hegemony, consensual
legitimacy, cosmopolitan values, and so on.
Foucault's conceptualization of power may be excessive, yet it clearly
demonstrates the impossibility of reconstituting the authentic life and
uncovering the truth about humanity in the systems of knowledge and power
circulating in the social system. The only truth one can learn about power is
its functionality and inseparability from the body of society and its
knowledge. Furthermore, the legal philosophical and political distinctions
between facts and norms, morality and legality or the public and private
spheres need to be critically analysed and assessed to show that legality's
basic norm actually depends on other societal norms and connections which
make it operate and produce normative effects. Legality can exert its
S38
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normative force only as the delegated and effectuated force of society. Legal
and moral philosophical distinctions between facts and norms need to be
reformulated as a genealogy of legal normativity.
Unsurprisingly, the law's societal power is plural, adopting different
normativities delegated by other societal regimes, networks, and systems. In
the following parts of this article, I therefore focus on the societal
constitution of political power, its function, and legal authorization, and
subsequently return to the social imaginaries to analyse their complex
legitimizing function and impact on constitutional imaginations including
political subjects and dissent in transnational legal regimes.
THE SOCIETAL CONSTITUTION OF THE MODERN POLITICAL
SYSTEM: ON POTESTAS
In one of her more sociologically inspired texts, Hannah Arendt contrasted
power with violence and concluded that, while being an intrinsic part of
power structures, violence also destabilizes them because of the lack of
choice of those subjected to violent coercion. According to her, the use of
physical violence requires the surrender of its subjects and the impossibility
of responding with any other action, because:
Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is
absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course
it ends in power's disappearance. This implies that it is not correct to think of
the opposite of violence as nonviolence; to speak of nonviolent power is
actually redundant. Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of
creating it . . . violence cannot be derived from its opposite, which is power
. . .39
Arendt accepted the necessity of what Weber called the organizational
structure and coercive apparatus40 and importantly formulated the problem
of power as the possibility of choice and selection of action on both sides ±
the powerful and those subjected to their power. In a similar way, Niklas
Luhmann stated that `power increases with freedom on both sides, and, for
example, in any given society, in proportion to the alternatives that society
creates.'41 The one-sidedness of the structure of physical coercion can
operate only in simple societal conditions. However, the complexity of
modern society requires many more efficient structures and organizations
opening the possibilities of alternative actions. The coercive apparatus,
therefore, is subjected to the basic power structure in which events can
always go according to, or against, the intent and will of the powerful.
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As Luhmann highlights, this possibility of forming `complementary
avoidance alternatives' is `power in its raw state' and shows that it has the
structure of a binary code.42 Nevertheless, the primary code of power/
powerless can lead to excessive levels of contingency and the secondary
coding of power by the binary code of legality and the right/wrong
distinction is required to stabilize the performance of power operations. The
`raw', socially diffuse, and insufficiently organized power is clarified and
enhanced by the impersonality of the code of legality and differentiation
between lawful and unlawful power.43
In this context, it has to be emphasized that even unlawful power is power
and any form of potentia has to be seriously taken into account by those in
potestas and auctoritas. This is the other side of Hobbes's statement
auctoritas, non veritas facit legem (authority, not truth, makes law).44 Power
is constituted by the double coding of power/powerless and lawful/unlawful,
yet this compatibility of power and legality also means that these two codes
are different and the `might is right' identification would be a far too
simplistic and reductionist theory of power.45
The differentiation of power into societal power, potentia, and political
power, potestas, is possible only because the modern political system could
originally monopolize power, concentrated in the hands of the sovereign
state, while excluding other forms of societal power, such as the power of the
systems of science, economy or religion, from its operations. Societal power
represents an externality of the political system which involves the risk of its
permanent destabilization by non-political interventions into political
operations. Before the distinction between lawful and unlawful power can
be applied, societal power, therefore, must be formalized and institu-
tionalized by the political system46 and separated from other social systems
and their binary coding, such as truth/falsity of knowledge in science, profit/
loss in economy, or transcendence/immanence in religion. As Luhmann
states, `society's political system takes over the creation, administration and
control of power for society.'47
In this self-constitution by self-limitation and functional differentiation,
the political system must distinguish between those forms of societal power
which can be transformed into political power and other forms which need to
be separated and excluded from politics as externalities belonging to the
social environment. This is exactly why the biggest problem of political
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modernity consists of keeping so much societal power outside the political
system and establishing the societal limits to which power can be politicized
and society depoliticized.
The secondary coding of legality transforms power of the politically
constituted system into the rule of constitutive law. However, mediating
political power through law is not restricted to the state or international
organizations and applies to all sorts of societal situations in which legality
can be used for the mobilization of power encoded in the most general
principle of the rule of law. Those who are powerless can use legality and
especially the ever more expansive discourse of human rights as a source of
their empowerment48 not just in democratic constitutional states but even in
the politically more restrictive and legally more arbitrary conditions of
authoritarian regimes.
Law is both the necessary and sufficient justification of political power.
Nevertheless, it is typical of authoritarian and totalitarian politics that these
power and legality codes are dysfunctional in them and distinctions between
formal and informal power or legal and illegal activities remain unclear.
Subsequently, political dissent, apart from the human rights and wrongs
arguments, needs to be reformulated through the metaphysical or existential
language of `living in truth' and so on, to confront these dysfunctions and
reconstruct both the power code as the possibility of avoidance alternatives
and the legality code as the rule of law and constitutional democratic
politics.
In this structural coupling between power and legality, the powerless
become empowered by the rightness of their demands and the powerful can
further augment and enhance their power by formulating it in the same
secondary code of legality. Modern society thus uses the systemic difference
between law and politics to paradoxically increase power by its legal
limitation.49 When the powerful are not right, they lose to the powerless who
are in the right. At the same time, the power of the powerful is further
strengthened by its legal justification50 and the early modern political
principle princeps legibus solutus est (`the ruler is exempt from the laws')
which used to be accompanied by the prince's moral commitment to protect
the common good against all sorts of evils and wrongs is replaced by the
sovereignty of the legal constitution which incorporates the moral meaning
of right and wrong into the language of constitutional rights and principles.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMAGINARIES OF THE UNITY OF
DIFFERENCES AND SOCIETAL PLURALISM: THE SECOND
COMMENT ON LEGITIMATION
The political system must differentiate between political and non-political
power to make sure that its power code does not `degenerate' into
coercion.51 The question of which power it is impossible to politicize is
particularly difficult in democratic societies because of their tendency to
increasingly apply democratic procedures and values in non-political sectors
of modern society. The expansive politics of democratization represents the
typically modern risk of political totalization which is no less dangerous for
the political system and its power code than the risk of depoliticization by
the juridification of power and the replacement of democratic deliberation by
differentiated expert legal knowledge and elitist epistemic communities of
senior judges and lawyers.
The risk of total societal politicization is a specific modern example of the
symbolic constitution of the `common origin' which includes the justifica-
tion of existing inequalities and informs the constitutional imagination and
different imaginaries from early civilizations to postmodernity. This
imagination is informed by founding myths and what Plato, in Socrates's
words, called a `royal lie'52 bringing together the principles of commutative
and distributive justice by making rulers and ruled alike believe that they
have the same origin and descent, yet belong to different classes and have
different roles and status in the polity.
The royal lie finds its specific expressions in modern ideologies and
imaginaries from nationalism to socialism and religious utopianism.
However, the distinction between the images of polity as unity and differ-
ence cannot be resolved by assigning supremacy to either unity or differ-
ence.53 Like any other collective form of life, polity only can be observed
and described as the unity of differences. Symbolic royal lies enhance the
image of unity and encourage moral commitment to the polity, including
individual sacrifice and belief in a common good while accepting the
existence of societal inequalities and differences as a permanent feature of
social life.
In modern constitutionalism, this symbolic rationality54 facilitates
arguments for both constitutional unity or sovereignty and the separation
of different constitutional powers, their opposition, ceaseless contestations,
institutional divisions, and configurations of dissent.55 Images of the dif-
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ferentiated unity and collective mobilization of republican constitutionalism
are contrasted to the images of liberal constitutionalism emphasizing the
differentiation and external societal limitation of political power. These
exhaustively discussed and familiar constitutionalist distinctions have their
competing heroes and role models nationally and internationally, from
Madison and Hamilton to Arendt and Lemkin or Habermas and Dworkin.
Nevertheless, they also can be explored and recontextualized by the
sociology of constitutionalism which often criticizes the imaginaries of
constitutionalism as focused too much on institutions of power, the
normativity of public law, the public sphere, and the concept of politics as
the common, shared by all members of a particular polity and imagined as
the bonds of collective identity and the difference between `us' and `them'.
If society can observe itself only as the unity of differences, the theory of
societal constitutions focuses on these differences and `constitutional frag-
ments'56 of the allegedly common public sphere unified by the polity's
constitution. Teubner's initial critique of political constitutionalism was
inspired by his earlier theoretical views of global legal pluralism and
inventive interpretation of Derrida's politics of sovereignty, constitution by
diffeÂrance, and, particularly, the concept of capillary constitutions57 which
was also used by Foucault to describe power expanding beyond the political
body into the peripheries and extremities of the social body.58
Distant echoes of Foucault's criticism of Kant's notion of Enlightenment
as a constellation when `the universal, the free, and the public uses of reason
are superimposed on one another'59 can be heard in Gunther Teubner's
critical theory of societal constitutions. Unlike Foucault's genealogy of the
power of the social norm and mechanisms of disciplining and societal
governance, Teubner's theory of societal constitutions calls for decoupling
the constitution and power. The expansion of the concept of constitution into
non-political systems, regimes, and sectors of society thus paradoxically
depoliticized the very concept of constitutionalism as the non-juridical
process of the self-constitutions of social subsystems, their functional
differentiation, and legal assistance in these primarily societal processes.60
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Furthermore, against Luhmann's concept of constitutions as organizations
of structural coupling between politics and law using the primary coding of
power and secondary coding of legality, Teubner argues that it is non-
political societal constitutions which externally limit power operating in the
systems of politics and law. He persuasively criticizes normative political
and legal theories and philosophies of constitutionalism, and emphasizes the
pluralist constitution of society. His notion of pluralism draws on the
sociological and anthropological perspective according to which no rule,
principle or norm can constitute its force itself and in isolation from its social
environment.61 According to this view, it is necessary to look for the
normative force in society and contrast it to other rules, principles, and
norms with their different regimes of validity and enforcement.
Nevertheless, the most original constitutional imaginary of global legal
pluralism and transnational regimes elaborated by Teubner and other
scholars62 did not dispose of some typically modern normative distinctions
of both social and constitutional theory, such as the distinctions between
political and civil society, legislated and living law,63 or vertically organized
imperium and horizontally evolving communitas. Societal constitutions were
originally defined as civil, spontaneously evolving, horizontally organized
and heterarchical alternatives to the political, administered, vertically
organized and hierarchical structures of political constitutions.64 The theo-
retical shift65 from the public, national, monist, and unified to the private,
transnational, pluralist, and fragmented networks and regimes included an
appraisal of the civil realm, with its informal structures which were con-
sidered both operative and normative counterpoints to the formally admini-
stered system of political power. Sciulli's normative expectations of societal
constitutions permeate Teubner's radical theory of transnational legal
pluralism and constitutionalism evolving independently of constituent and
constituted powers and its political subjects.66
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A RETURN OF POLITICAL SUBJECTS? ON THE IMAGINARIES OF
TRANSNATIONAL DEMOI, AND DISSENT IN SOCIETAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM
In light of these initial conceptualizations of the theory of societal con-
stitutionalism and their criticisms,67 Teubner's most recent article, `Quod
Omnes Tangit: Transnational Constitutions Without Democracy?'68
represents a significant change because it returns to the two most defining
political issues of any general theory of constitutionalism, namely, the
problems of legitimation and constitutional subjects.
In Constitutional Fragments, Teubner called for turning different
normative regimes, networks, and sectors of global society into new
constitutional subjects while abandoning the old imaginary of political
constitutionalism with the people/nation as its sovereign subject and
constituent power. Depicting the pluralist constitution of global society
and its legal regimes, he effectively proved that no symbolic bonds between
rulers and the ruled could constitute the unity of one nation which could
operate as constituent power and the ultimate foundation and reason of
political existence.
The Enlightenment and Romantic images of popular sovereignty, nation
state, and democratic constitutionalism were expected to give way to a
global system of transnational constitutional regimes in which different
groups and individuals could claim their interest and which, like other
societal constitutions, were expected to function as legal assistance to
societal self-constitutionalization.69 If constitutional modernity means the
differentiation of the economic, political, and legal rationalities, part of
which was the process of inventing the people as the subject of sovereign
power,70 the constitutional postmodernity of societal constitutionalism
involves abandoning this ultimate subject of politics and constituting non-
human and non-political subjects imaginable as a fragmentation and a
plurality of regimes and networks within the system of global law.
In `Quod Omnes Tangit', Teubner, however, admits that democratic
legitimacy and its deficits are the `Achilles heel' of transnational regimes
and societal constitutionalism.71 Addressing the `hard core of democracy',72
he even returns to the identitarian aspect of democracy and, contrary to his
earlier statements, argues that the conditions of the global trans-
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nationalization of law require a rethinking and recontextualization of
democracy, including its relational aspect and the self-identification of the
authors of rules and decisions and those affected by them, even if these new
`constituencies' and `demoi' of transnational regimes are fluctuating and
involve the affected outsiders as much as the corporate members in pos-
session of expert knowledge which are `the sources of regime authority'.73
This shift means a return of both democratic legitimation and political
subject into the theory of societal constitutionalization which, furthermore,
reinvents the classical image of constitutional authority as the mutual
recognition of the rulers and the ruled. Importantly, this relational element of
authority includes the distinction between the self-constituent legitimate rule
of law and mere performance- and efficiency-driven managerial govern-
ance.74 Teubner reinterprets this as a replacement for the political imagination
of democracy constituted within the nation state by a reconceptualization of
demos defined by the general strategy of dissent and specific self-contestations
internally constituted by individual transnational regimes.
These profound theoretical changes accommodate recent research into the
sociology of transnational political constitutionalism and the global recon-
textualization of typical issues, such as the tension between populism and
expertise, the justification of governance, and human rights. They have been
innovatively elaborated and refined, for instance, by Blokker's sociological
theory of constitutional populism75 and Kjaer's theory of global constitu-
tionalism and governance.76
In this context, Teubner's reflections on democratic politics effectively
mean that the general principle quod omnes tangit (`what touches all')
becomes the basic political norm of globally operating transnational regimes
and their legal pluriverse. Instead of consensus building, this pluriverse
constitutes itself by internal proceduralization of dissent and institutionalized
self-contestations of rules and decisions which vary due to the epistemic
diversity of transnational regimes. The quod omnes tangit principle, there-
fore, needs to be supplemented by the principle of `epistemic subsidiarity'77
which reflects on the variety of types of legitimizing knowledge circulating
in global law and supports the development of self-contestation procedures
in different regimes.78
These two principles legitimize transnational regimes both internally, as
the democratic inclusion of all affected parties, and externally, as the societal
S46
73 id., p. S21.
74 For the legal philosophical context, see, especially, L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law
(1969) 210.
75 P. Blokker, `Politics and the Political in Sociological Constitutionalism' in Blokker
and Thornhill (eds.), op. cit., n. 54, p. 178.
76 P.F. Kjaer, Constitutionalism in the Global Realm: A Sociological Approach (2014).
77 S. Jasanoff, `Epistemic Subsidiarity: Coexistence, Cosmopolitanism, Constitu-
tionalism' (2013) 2 European J. of Risk Regulation 133.
78 Teubner, op. cit., n. 68, p. S27.
ß 2018 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2018 Cardiff University Law School
exclusion of totalizing knowledge and arguments coming from other social
systems, such as economy, science or religion. Furthermore, they refor-
mulate the concept of demos by removing the supremacy of consensus and
unity from its political self-identification. Teubner's initial critique of the
existentialist concept of demos as the constitution's sovereign power and
subject is thus further qualified by his proceduralist understanding of demoi
as agencies constituted by the system's internal self-contestations and dissent
capacities.
All these recent innovations may even represent a radical rethink of the
distinction between le politique and la politique announced, but not yet fully
elaborated, to offer an alternative version of politics in societal constitu-
tionalism in Constitutional Fragments.79 However, they also raise some
questions regarding the function, operations, and limitations of these prin-
ciples, political subjects, procedures of self-contestations and dissent, and the
pluralistic structures and knowledge formations of global societal
constitutions.
The first question relates to the function of the quod omnes tangit prin-
ciple in non-political societal self-constitutions. Should it be the generally
applicable norm of self-constitutions of specific social systems and regimes,
it would pose the risk of the total politicization of societal constitutions by
the rule of democracy, irrespective of the variations, reconceptualizations
and operative transformations from consensus building to the proceduraliza-
tion of dissent and self-contestations.
However, if it is not the basic political norm permeating all societal
constitutions, is it something more than mere external political assistance to
the self-constitution and self-identification of social systems, which actually
plays a very limited role and does not affect the general operations of these
systems because, by definition, the autopoietic system's self-constitutive
operations cannot be affected by operations of its social environment? This
second question is closely related to the earlier criticisms of Teubner's
definition of societal constitution as primarily systemic non-juridical social
processes of self-reference and self-identification assisted by the system of
law.80
Finally, the question of constitutional subjects invites various
interpretations, from the conventional focus on individual and collective
positions in the system of power to the more sociologically challenging
explorations of knowledge production and its constitutive role. The third
question thus involves the problem of the self-constitution of the system's
episteme, its different subjects and knowledge as the source of the system's
constitutional authority including the intrinsic political tension between
democracy and technocracy, respectively, the public and expert reason.
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THE POST-ENLIGHTENMENT LEGITIMATION OF AUCTORITAS: ON
THE KNOWLEDGE AND IRONIES OF POTENTIA IN SOCIETAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Teubner's comment on democratic legitimacy as the Achilles heel of
transnational constitutionalism indicates a more general problem in global
society, that is, the surplus of power and the shortage of authority. The
absence of a global constitutional polity and its fragmentation into the
different subjects of varied societal constitutions cannot obscure the fact that
these constitutions are power organizations which cannot be exclusively
legitimized by their social efficacy and steering capacity.
The general distinction between legitimation by the governing capacity
and authorized power, gubernaculum and iurisdictio, finds its specific for-
mulation in Teubner's poetic expression of the functioning of transnational
regimes as `tunnel vision'. It is caused by the regimes' highly specialized
policy fields and expert knowledge which, therefore, require the adoption of
international public law principles, especially constitutional toleration and
constitutional compromise.81
These normative strategies and procedures of authorization in global legal
pluralism cannot be easily dismissed, for instance, by the labelling of
pluralism as `the laziest of all compromises',82 because Teubner's notion of
pluralism and the call for transnational constitutional compromises and
toleration are primarily informed by the systemic and epistemic plurality of
global law and cannot be simply re-interpreted as normative expectations of
political pluralism. Using Unger's concept of `institutional imagination',83
Teubner invites his reader to engage in the construction of new imaginaries
of legal legitimation and authorization suitable for the global legal system,
operating independently of the differences between international and trans-
national, public and private, or substantive and procedural law. However,
Teubner's approach also shows that the theory of societal constitutions
cannot ignore the constitutional imaginaries of modern national and inter-
national politics and law and their potential to address legitimation deficits in
globalized societal constitutionalism.
Global societal constitutions are organizations of non-state and non-
political power legitimized by the internally constructed subjects and
externally restricted by the impossibility of turning their specific policy
regulations and knowledge into holistic notions of good governance or
cosmopolitan ethics and politics.84 They operate independently of the
foundationalist and essentialist constitutional recourse to the pre-existent
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national or any other polity and subject.85 They reformulate the idea of
constitutional polity's self-rule as the self-constitution of societal power. They
are the holders of power beyond politics and legitimation beyond legality.
The power of expert knowledge is the source of authority in societal
constitutions due to its ability to produce social norms and establish the
conditions and criteria of efficient governance. The tension between
democracy and technocracy in societal constitutions may be managed by
the internal constitutions of demoi with the potentia of dissent and its
execution through the procedures of self-contestation. However, this
suggestion favoured by Teubner also has to consider the irreconcilability
of codes of law and normalization and its recursive impact on what Foucault
described as the juridico-discursive model of power86 which may not be
central, yet continues to be an intrinsic part of the constitution of modern
society.
It is less important to have a theory of power than its analytics,87
including the analytics of the process of the retreat of the representation and
exercise of power through the medium of legality. If law becomes incapable
of coding power and serving as its symbolic representation, alternative forms
of normativity and knowledge will take its place and legality's abstract
enhancement of power will be coupling with the power of these social norms
and non-juridical normalizations. The theory of societal constitutions,
therefore, has to analyse not only power without legitimacy but also
powerful imaginaries constituting the possibility of legitimation and the
`jurisprudence' of different knowledge regimes ± clinical, educational,
scientific, digital, and so on.88 Understanding this jurisprudence of different
disciplines of knowledge assumes identifying and analysing their
constitutional imaginaries, including the subjects of societal constitutions.
The theory of the societal constitutions (and jurisprudence) of both legal
and non-legal knowledge regimes must involve a genealogy of constitutional
imaginaries and their legitimation potential. It has to diverge from recent
sociological theories of legal pluralism and reflexive law promising to
replace state law and formal institutions with civil society and informal
networks.89 Power would not become more legitimate if it were constituted
in the transnational private and public spheres of global society instead of in
the coercive apparatuses of the nation state and international organizations.
The sheer number of books published on the `global transformations' of law,
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ethics, politics, and society in the last several decades actually warns any
researcher against hasty promises of new legitimation formulas evolving in
this context.90
Societal constitutionalism should not disconnect from the idea of sove-
reignty and territorial control only to reconnect with some reflexive ideas of
the collective self-rule of the multitude and the plurality of political subjects
constituted at global level. It is not subjects and their actions that constitute
the subsystems of societal constitutions and legitimize their power because
the subject is constituted by the system itself. Systems do not recognize
subjects but produce them. New imaginaries of globally reflexive con-
stitutional identities of the multitudinous self cannot fulfil the promise of
substituting for the reified essentialist images of nationhood and statehood
and legitimize transnational polities the contested collective identity, because
these contestations depend on the systemic rationality of transnational
regimes, rather than on the political will and subjects' actions.
The reflexive and differentiated images of demoi pushing back the
expansive power of expert knowledge and conditioning it by the varied
procedures of democratic legitimation are not enough for the legitimation of
transnational societal constitutions. Rather, it is important to analyse how
these constitutions manage to turn the affected populations into legitimate
demoi and how they translate their specific expert knowledge into generally
shared rules and normative regimes. This constitutionalization of the
systemic facts of power as legitimizing the values of the system and the
transformation of societal immanence into transcendental ideals can be
identified in political as much as societal constitutions. It thus needs to be
recontextualized by using Foucault's analytics of power and Teubner's
democratic proceduralization of dissent as much as Luhmann's ironies of
autopoietic social systems.
Instead of searching for constitutional reflexivity or the lifeworld's
reservoir of meaning and positive values restricting the factual power of
social systems and externally legitimizing them beyond the limits of society,
one has to be critical of the very concept of political subjectivity and
acknowledge the profound irony of the paradoxically liberating effects of
systemic alienation and operationalization of values.91 There is no
legitimation to be found in the lifeworld's authenticity contrasted with
systemic rationality. No plan of fixing the economic base can save us from
illegitimacies fluctuating in the societal superstructure. No eternity clauses
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and fundamental values inscribed in constitutional documents can guarantee
political, legal, and societal stability, continuity, and persistence without
their immanent and effective enforcement. It is actually the recognition of
the functional differentiation and heterarchical systemic plurality of modern
society that leads to the rejection of the fact-value dichotomy and bivalence-
driven models of legitimation and their replacement by `cybernetic irony'
and `the ironic code' of systemic polyvalence in which both political and
non-political subjects `appear to be something between a local hero and a
local loser'.92
This cybernetic ontology,93 systemic rationality, and functional differen-
tiation fortunately puts even the sociology of constitutionalism beyond good
and evil and replaces this binary moral coding so popular in legitimation
theories with an ethics of complexity resigned to searching for absolutes,
eternity clauses, and essences in our political and legal reality. However, this
ethics of complexity, distancing itself from what Peter Sloterdijk described
as `the furor metaphysicus'94 and its potential to authorize power structures
by the ironies of societal polyvalence, is yet to be critically addressed in the
context of other legitimation strategies, particularly those of systemic self-
contestations and dissent formulated by Gunther Teubner in his latest
imaginative study.
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